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Despite common national institutions and incentives to remake urban landscapes to 
anchor growth, generate land-lease revenues, and display a capacious administration, Chinese 
urban governments exhibit varying levels of control over land. This article uses a paired 
comparison of Dalian and Harbin in China’s Northeast to link differences in local political 
economies to land politics. Dalian, benefitting from early access to foreign capital, consolidated 
control over urban territory through the designation of a development zone, which realigned 
local economic interests and introduced dual pressures for enterprises to restructure and relocate. 
Harbin, facing capital shortages, distributed urban territory to assuage losers of reform and 
promote economic growth. The findings suggest that 1) growth strategies, and the territorial 
politics they produce, are products the post-Mao urban hierarchy rather than of socialist legacies, 
and, 2) perhaps surprisingly, local governments exercise the greatest control over urban land in 
cities that adopted market reforms earliest.  
 
The international community has looked on the phenomenal process of urbanization and 
urban spatial restructuring in China with equal parts awe and suspicion. While some interpret 
Chinese advances in infrastructure as evidence of the country’s coming of age, others emphasize 
the “dominance of the state” at the expense of individuals and major groups in society.
 2 The 
pace and scale of urban growth, infrastructure construction and spatial restructuring has become, 
in the aggregate, a metaphor for China’s economic miracle. For individual cities, urban 
landscapes serve as manifestations of ambition and evidence of a promising future. Nearly every 
Chinese city has a museum devoted to urban planning, typically showcasing the city’s spatial 
and territorial ambitions in the next ten to thirty years. Reading the urban strategic plans for any 
size Chinese city can be an exercise in repetition: nearly every one aspires to be a “global hub,” a 
“cultural, economic, and political center,” and an attractive environment for foreign and 
domestic investment. The similarity of these ambitions, however, belies deep divergence in 
growth strategies and changes to urban landscapes. Presumably, all local governments want to 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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remake the urban landscape to be better suited to both anchoring economic investment and 
displaying a modern and capacious administration. Yet, some cities boast successful 
implementation of projects to relocate enterprises and residents, establish special function 
economic zones, and landscapes generally free of illegal construction and slums, whereas other 
cities have poor records of implementing their own urban planning projects and landscapes that 
reflect such a lack of control.   
This article draws on a paired comparison of two similar cities in a single region—the 
Northeastern rust belt—to argue that patterns of urban land politics are products of the different 
political economies created by changes in the post-Mao urban hierarchy and the sequencing of 
opening and reform. Dalian in Liaoning Province, like many cities that benefitted from early 
access to foreign capital as a result of preferential policies bestowed by Beijing, designated a 
development zone outside the urban core to rebalance the concentration of economic power in 
favor of pro-reform coalitions while leaving the urban core, the pre-reform power base, 
undisturbed during the early states of reform and opening. The city of Harbin, which did not 
enjoy open privileges until the mid-1990s, instead pursued decentralization of authority over 
policies such as housing, enterprise reform, and the growth of private entrepreneurship, 
distributing urban land control to assuage losers of economic reforms and spur growth. The 
different reform era urban political economies—resulting from changes to the urban hierarchy 
and the distribution of preferential policies from Beijing—have produced different approaches to 
urban territory and patterns of land control in these initially similar cities. 
I.  MUNICIPAL STATES AND URBAN POLITICS IN CHINA    	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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Territory—politicized space over which groups struggle for control, occupation, and 
access—is an important locus of political conflict in China.
3 Urban land may simply be a 
commodity, but territorial politics emerge when various factions struggle for political control of 
land. Confrontation between citizens and local authorities over land has been one of the most 
visible flashpoints of state-society conflict in rural and urban China alike. In rural areas, the 
requisition of collectively-owned (jiti 集体) farmland has constituted an incendiary process of 
conflict between peasants and local governments.
4 In urban China, both the international media 
and scholars have turned their attention toward grand projects of urban renewal and 
transformation and the dislocations and historical destruction that accompany them.
5 Moreover, 
the combination of local government reliance on land-leasing for revenues and real estate 
speculation has driven up housing and property values across urban China, constituting a 
potential social crisis as many are squeezed out of the housing market and a potential economic 
crisis in the form of an asset bubble.
6  
You-Tien Hsing has characterized the urban politics of the 1990s in China as 
“competition for urban land control.” Hsing envisions municipal state agents pitted against 
collective and state-owned factory managers and other quasi-state actors who have de facto 
rights to urban land based on long-term usage, in a struggle for control of land resources within 
the urban core: “China’s urban politics unfolds as an intra-state struggle over land by these two 
sets of statist actors.”
7 However, not all cities appear mired in the kind of intra-state conflict that 
she emphasizes. Moreover, participants outside of the state—urban residents, private economic 
actors, informal sector workers who occupy dilapidated or unmanaged spaces, and so forth—
may mount significant challenges to the local state’s pursuit of territorial control. Why are some 
local governments successful in outmaneuvering competitors for land control when others are 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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not, and under what conditions do other urban groups exercise meaningful control over the urban 
landscape? To this end, we may understand variation in the local state’s ability to monopolize the 
allocation of urban property rights territorial consolidation and territorial fragmentation. A local 
state has consolidated its control over the territory within its purview when it is the sole arbiter of 
the rights to the use, transfer, and income generated from urban land. Territorial fragmentation 
characterizes cities in which multiple and competing claims to urban land, from groups both in 
and outside of the state, thwart the municipal state’s efforts at spatial restructuring. This article 
expands on Hsing’s formulation to address this inter-urban variation. More specifically, I 
propose a comparative political economy of land politics that links differences in economic 
development strategies to patterns of urban territorial control.
8 
What follows details how different political economies of growth and reform took shape 
in initially similar cities as they sought to pursue growth given different resources and 
constraints. While much has been made of decentralization and urban China as a “laboratory for 
reform,” the distribution and timing of preferential policies from Beijing allowed some cities 
access to foreign capital before or as they undertook politically difficult reforms, while others 
undertook reforms under resource constraints. These changes to the post-Mao urban hierarchy 
have created fundamentally different rules of state-market relations across urban China, in 
evidence in this article with regard to growth and territorial strategies. In both cities, the 
management of land was integral to growth and reform strategies, but according to different 
logics. Dalian neglected the traditional urban core to build a new base of economic vitality and 
political support in the development zone, then later simultaneously recapitalized on downtown 
land while implementing enterprise reforms. Harbin, facing capital shortages, treated urban 
territory as a resource for distribution to real and potential losers of reform, steadily relinquishing 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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control to residents, enterprises, and even lower levels of the municipal government. The 
management of intra-local competition established patterns of territoriality that continue to mark 
urban landscapes and structure urban politics today.  
Some clarification about methods, sources, and definitions is in order before proceeding. 
First, I analyze the relationship between land politics and political economy at the municipal as 
opposed to the provincial level for two primary reasons. First, because financial revenues 
generated through land development (in the form of both taxes and land-lease fees) accrue to 
local governments, decisions about specific sites of urban redevelopment and expansion are 
generally initiated and implemented at the local level. Second, preferential policies that 
determine the sequencing and extent of reform and opening are also bestowed on cities rather 
than provinces. Given that the opening of land-leasing markets was national policy in the late 
1980s and early 1990s and a lack of variation in provincial level policies toward land and 
housing, the comparison of cities is most appropriate.
9 That Harbin is a provincial capital and 
Dalian is not may complicate the comparison, as some scholars have suggested that power in 
provincial capitals leans heavily toward the state and away from social actors, and therefore that 
they should be analyzed in a category unto themselves.
10 In this comparison, however, the 
provincial capital proves to be the lesser capacious in managing land politics, so if anything the 
the relevance of political economy and the sequencing of reforms seems robust to differences in 
administrative hierarchy in this case. In considering urban politics in China, however, the 
boundaries of the “municipality” is all but clear, since cities encompass urban districts as well as 
counties and sub-urban cities.
11 In this article, I discuss land politics in the urban districts (shiqu 
市区) only in Harbin and Dalian, therefore excluding the counties and subsidiary cities under the 
administrative purview of these municipalities. In both cities, expansion in the form of 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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development zones and “new cities” (xinqu, 新区) has brought the conversion of counties into 
urban districts (i.e. Dalian’s Jinzhou County became Jinzhou District in 1987, and Hulan County 
split into Hulan and Songbei urban districts in Harbin in 2004 with the development of the 
Jiangbei New Area). I refer to the urban districts existing at the beginning of the reform era as 
the “urban core,” as opposed to new districts and development zones established during urban 
expansion since the early 1980s. See Figures 2 and 3 for maps of each city.  
This article relies on data gathered during twelve months of fieldwork between in 2007 
and 2008. Sources include written materials gathered from local libraries, the Harbin Municipal 
Archives, and materials on urban planning and land policies kindly shared by local officials and 
researchers and on file with the author. My observations also rely on formal but unstructured 
interviews conducted with roughly two sets of local actors: first, urban planners and academics, 
groups that more frequently than not overlap in Chinese cities. The second group consisted of 
local government economic officials, chiefly from Municipal Land Resource Bureaux, Municipal 
Bureaux of Industry and Commerce, and local branches of the Development and Reform 
Commission. Ever subject to the limits of access when conducting research on topics as 
politically sensitive as land conflict in urban China, the scope of interviewees is less 
comprehensive and the data relayed in them subject to greater scrutiny. However, I purposefully 
combine impressionistic data relayed in interviews with a heavy reliance on written sources and 
documentation to create as reliable a narrative as possible of urban change within these two cities.  
II. TWO CITIES, ONE REGION: DALIAN AND HARBIN 
(Figure 1 here) 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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Northeastern China, China’s “Old Industrial Base,” provides an ideal laboratory in which 
to investigate the phenomena of post-socialist urban reform and territoriality. The region—
consisting of Heilongjiang, Liaoning, and Jilin provinces—entered the Maoist era with a strong 
industrial base established during the construction of the China Eastern Railway and during 
Japanese occupation. After 1949, the region continued to be home to China’s industrial base, as 
urban areas received large amounts of state investment for the construction of state-owned 
enterprises focused on heavy industrial production. Cities in the Northeast, then, share a similar 
set of legacies from the command economy: vast numbers of formal sector workers and the 
attendant social welfare burdens, local economies dominated by state-owned enterprises, a 
relative lack of diaspora connections compared to the coastal Southeast, and strong institutions 
designed for collective production and consumption.
12  
In the reform era, the once-privileged provinces of the Northeast have suffered a “drastic 
reversal of fortune” as they are home to the greatest “institutional liabilities and legacies of the 
command economy” and have seen precious little of the dynamism that characterizes regional 
economies elsewhere.
13 Yet, the fortunes of reform have favored Dalian and Harbin very 
differently (see Table 1). Dalian has managed to “reterritorialize” itself out of the rustbelt and 
into the global economy.
14 Harbin, on the other hand, is said to have “dropped off the central 
government’s radar screen” after 1979.
15 These differences in political economy, rooted in the 
distribution of preferential policies from Beijing, are attended by differences in demonstrated 
control over the urban landscape.  
In the early 1990s, Dalian began to attract the attention and envy of many cities as it 
amassed prestigious awards and titles related to its achievements in the urban environment: 
“Environmental Protection Model City” in 1992, one of China’s “Ten Most Beautiful” in 1992, 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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and the first city in China and second in Asia to be included in the UN “Global 500” for livable 
environments in 1995.
16 Dalian’s urban landscape evinces a palpable presence of state control 
and urban management to the visitor, mostly free of informal markets, dilapidated housing, and 
visible signs of urban blight or poverty, especially in urban core commercial areas and the city’s 
new industrial districts. Dalian officials, as reflected in everything from municipal publications 
to a museum devoted to showcasing the construction of “Modern Dalian,” are extremely proud 
of the city’s appearance. Long-time Dalian mayor Bo Xilai celebrated in an interview that real 
estate prices in downtown Dalian increased 500% between 1994 and 1999, a development that 
certainly benefitted municipal authorities who leased downtown land to developers.
17  
(Table 1 here) 
  The urban landscape in Harbin, on the other hand, confronts the visitor with a visual 
mélange of the results of the reform era. Harbiners often refer to the three core urban districts of 
the city, Daoli, Nangang, and Daowai, as “heaven” (tiandi 天地), “purgatory” (lianyu 炼狱), and 
“hell” or “the inferno” (diyu 地狱), respectively. Daoli District is home to much of the city’s 
characteristic Russian architecture, the commercial and retail center of the city, and a great deal 
of new development projects that capitalize on prime real estate prices through high overhead 
commercial centers or high-rise residential buildings. Many of the city’s universities as well as 
its embryonic Central Business District are located in Nangang District, where main arteries 
display department stores and modern residential compounds next door to informal street 
markets, pre-reform housing units, and buildings associated with now closed factories with the 
character for “demolition” (chai 拆) displayed prominently on every surface. During my ten-
month tenure in the city, many of these areas slated for demolition remained untouched by 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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bulldozers and occupied by former residents, even without heat in China’s harshest winter. 
Daowai District, called “the inferno” not only as a reference to hell but also because of the 
frequency of conflagrations when residents heat wooden homes by fire, typifies post-industrial 
urban blight: abandoned buildings, haphazard new construction, few signs of disposable income, 
few large parks and green areas, and so forth. Yet, residents seem in no hurry to flee their 
neighborhoods for higher ground. Street-level commerce is visibly vibrant, real estate prices 
(even for quite old structures) are as high as other parts of the city, and relations among 
neighbors appear mutually dependent.
18     
(Figure 2 here) 
Harbin has mounted two unsuccessful attempts to expand outside the urban core: a new 
district north of the Songhua River and a “high technology development zone” to the west. These 
new areas are called, respectively, “Ghostown” (guicheng 鬼城) and “Corruption Street” (fubai 
de yitiaojie 腐败的一条街). Land for the Songbei new zone was requisitioned in the mid-1990s, 
but development did not begin until the first few years of the 2000s.
 19 In the district’s early 
period, many wealthy Harbiners purchased apartments in Songbei as investments, but have not 
been able to rent their properties and have themselves not moved because of transportation 
inconvenience and the lack of commercial and retail development in the area.
20 The development 
zone to the west is home to the Heilongjiang provincial government complex as well as some of 
the most expensive and exclusive restaurants in the city. After the city received national level 
and provincial level funding for transportation and infrastructure development in the area 
between 1994 and 2001, much of the newly valuable land was leased to high-end restaurants and 
residential developments, hence the moniker “corruption street.”
21 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
Harbin and Dalian cities, despite initially similar urban landscapes and socio-economic 
structures, have developed remarkably different urban political economies since 1978. Dalian 
received open status early during reforms, pushing the local economy toward export orientation 
and providing access to foreign capital. Reforms to the state sector were undertaken in a climate 
of competition, both with foreign firms and among domestic firms seeking foreign capital to 
upgrade and survive. Harbin, like other regional cities without extensive access to foreign capital 
and investment, attempted to grow through streamlining the public economy and nurturing 
small-scale entrepreneurship. The municipal government was challenged to execute politically 
difficult enterprise reforms in a climate of scarcity and fear of social instability. The two cities 
also represent very different outcomes with regard to the local state’s control over territory. 
Dalian is a case of territorial consolidation;
 the local state has secured itself as the sole authority 
over the use, occupation, and allocation of urban territory. Harbin, conversely, is a case of 
“territorial fragmentation,” since various groups outside and inside the local state stake claims to 
urban spaces and thwart municipal efforts at spatial restructuring. The next two sections detail 
how a globally-oriented political economy augmented the local state’s control over land in 
Dalian and a political economy of survival eroded that control in Harbin. 
II.  TERRITORIAL CONSOLIDATION IN DALIAN 
With its coastal location at the tip of the Liaodong peninsula, Dalian was well positioned 
in the 1980s to benefit from opening to international trade and investment through the coastal 
development policy.
22 Like cities all over China that would later adopt development zones as the 
centerpiece of their growth strategies, Dalian’s pursued a territorial strategy of spatially 
segregating the activities of the new economy from those of the old, creating competition both 
between the globalist and socialist constituencies and also among state firms. Through 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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development zoning first and then introducing reforms to the state sector through forced 
enterprise relocation outside of the urban core, the Dalian municipal state recalibrated the spatial 
distribution of power in the city and managed urban interests in a way that established the state 
as arbiter rather than target of political conflict.  
Development Zoning 
  Dalian’s initiation into the “winners’ circle” of the reform era began with its designation 
as one of fourteen coastal open cities in May of 1984, a designation that handed decision-making 
power regarding foreign capital in the form of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) or foreign 
direct investment (FDI) to the municipal authorities. The city’s authorities looked outside the 
core urban districts for the physical space to anchor new forms of economic activity. Even before 
Beijing conferred special status upon Dalian, the city’s 1980 master plan (zongti guihua 总体规
划) included preliminary designation of a development zone (kaifaqu 开发区) in what was the 
Maqiaozi village in then suburban Jinzhou County, a full 35 kilometers from the city center in 
Zhongshan and Xigang districts (See Figure 3).
23   
            (Figure 3 here) 
Though the strategy of designating a specific space for foreign-oriented development 
may strike any present observer of urban China as unexciting, in 1984, directing new investment 
an hour’s driving distance from a traditional urban center was novel. The Dalian Economic 
Development and Technology Zone (or Dalian Development Area, DDA) was the very first such 
space in China.
24 The DDA offered a number of formal benefits to foreign firms to entice them 
to either invest in local enterprises or relocate to the DDA, including a lower tax rate and no real 
estate taxes for the first three years of the investment period.
25 The strategy of development 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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zoning gained greater momentum in the early 1990s after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour. In 
October 1992, the Dalian Tax Free Zone (baoshui qu 保税区) was established adjacent to the 
DDA in Jinzhou District, China’s “first domestically located, foreign-run (jingnei guanwai 境内
关外) economic area.”
26 Space was also designated for high-technology parks around the DDA 
and to the southwest of the city center. Figure 4 maps the locations of the 17 smaller 
“development zones” established between 1992 and 1999 (15 in 1992 alone) throughout the city; 
only one of the special zones is located within the three core urban districts (Zhongshan, Xigang, 
and Shahekou).   
            (Figure 4 here) 
These spatial strategies held certain advantages for the firms that invested in them, 
advantages economists associate with clustering and agglomeration; access to transport, 
concentration of skilled labor, opportunities for technology transfer, dense warehousing 
networks, and so forth.
27 As spatial zoning for development and clustering have gained currency 
in international development circles—partially based on the Chinese experience—observers have 
focused mostly on the benefits to enterprises and less on the political benefits enjoyed by local 
governments. In Dalian, these special designations allowed the state itself to preside over the 
spatial distribution of growth and investment and provided a space in which to experiment under 
conditions of economic and political uncertainty. Municipal publications from the 1980s and 
1990s highlight the establishment of the DDA and show pride that the zone was the first of its 
kind in China. Explanations for the rationale for establishing the zone outside the city, however, 
make no mention of the economic benefits of clustering, and instead invoke reasons such as 
avoiding the problems of the urban core and establishing a new place to absorb migrant labor. In 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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an explanation of the benefits of Dalian’s novel development zoning strategy in a flagship 
national urban planning magazine, members of the Urban Planning Bureau write, 
The new area has an extraordinary number of benefits. Principally, it avoids the 
downtown area’s ‘urban heart disease.’ Population density [in the urban core] is already 
declining (though it was already lower than national standard). The migrant populations 
would threaten the low population density, so it is best to attract them to the new urban 
area.
28   
Dalian has indeed long been a leading destination for rural-to-urban and inter-urban migration; 
according to official data, Dalian has by far the largest “floating population” in the Northeast. 
The official migration rate between 1980 and 1989 averaged 12 per cent increase per annum.
29 A 
1988 Public Security Bureau survey shows more dramatic numbers, estimating a “floating 
population” (i.e. unofficial migrants without Dalian hukou) of 388,000 people, over 80 per cent 
of whom resided outside the urban core.
 30 More recent census data on migration confirms that 
the DDA continues to be the main destination for arrivals from outside the city. Jinzhou and 
Ganjingzi Districts housed 26 and 30 per cent respectively of Dalian city migrants living outside 
their place of registration (hukou), and each held 33 per cent—two-thirds in total—of migrants 
from outside the province.
31 Popular conceptions of the differences between the “new” and “old” 
city underscore the importance of the population distribution. Officials in the DDA insisted that 
the DDA is like an “immigrant city,” its population “young, open-minded, and part of China’s 
transformation.”
32 People in the Dalian urban core harbor resentment toward the DDA and the 
people who live and work there, arguing that the city is biased toward the new areas and that 
Dalian’s new wealth only benefits people not originally from Dalian. Rather than blaming the 
state or city authorities for their bad fortune, the “losers” of reform directed their frustration 
against another population in the city. 
Sequencing of Reforms 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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  By the early 1990s, the DDA was the liveliest point of the Dalian economy and the locus 
of market-based productivity. Mary Gallagher has argued that the sequencing of reform and 
opening at the national level has both bolstered the CCP’s grip on power as well as encouraged 
further economic liberalization. Early FDI liberalization fragmented elements of society and 
pitted regions against each other in competing for scarce capital flows, recasting the ideological 
debate over privatization as “one of Chinese industrial survival amid ever-increasing foreign 
competition.”
33 The strategy of development zoning introduced these competitive pressures 
within the city of Dalian, pitting a moribund state sector in the urban core against a vibrant 
development zone outside of the city and rendering potential claimants to urban territory and the 
workers beneath them dependent on the municipal government for survival.  
The politically and economically difficult enterprise reforms were undertaken later in the 
1990s, as enterprises were forced to relocate from the urban core into new development zones 
and specially designated industrial zones as part of the city’s massive enterprise relocation 
(banqi 般企) campaign. 1992 became the turning point after which the urban core became a 
target for redevelopment rather than an area to be avoided in favor of the periphery. The 
campaign was carried out jointly by the Municipal Bureau of Industry and Commerce (MBIC), 
Urban Planning and Land Resource Management Bureaus, and the Dalian Municipal Housing 
Authority, who held authority over approximately 83 per cent of residential housing in the urban 
core.
34 With Bo at the head of a campaign to beautify and spatially reconfigure the city, between 
1994 and 2001, these institutions relocated 115 enterprises from Zhongshan and Xigang districts 
alone, freeing over 3 million square meters of land.
35 
Relocation targeted enterprises desperate for capital infusion; municipal authorities would 
guarantee capital infusions for the enterprises in exchange for turning over downtown land. The 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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typical process involved leasing development zone land at a very low cost to an enterprise (an 
MBIC official in an interview insisted that land was essentially “given away”), and then leasing 
out the enterprise’s former downtown space with a promise that some of the capital acquired 
would be released to the moved enterprise for facility upgrading and technological investments.
36 
Critically, city officials would also assist with locating foreign joint venture partners for 
enterprises that agreed to move, enabling the city to simultaneously reclaim downtown land from 
enterprises and execute management and ownership restructuring. For example, the Bohai Beer 
Factory, which occupied 30,000 square meters in Zhongshan District, was designated for 
relocation in 1995. The MBIC negotiated its acquisition by a Hong Kong investment firm, and 
also turned over half of the land-lease fee to the factory when the Land Management Bureau 
secured the former area for a Korean Commercial Venture (a large mall).
37 When Sanyo located 
production facilities in the DDA in 1996, the DDA assisted with the creation of a large 
conglomeration firm in which Sanyo was partnered with 16 SOEs relocated from the downtown 
core. These SOEs were competing with each other to suffer the least number of layoffs.
38 
Municipal authorities, then, concurrently reclaimed factory-occupied land and executed 
enterprise restructuring. 
  Securing the acquiescence of factory managers who faced underperforming enterprises 
and painful downsizing in any case was not especially challenging. The thorny parts of the 
relocation campaign—and the ones rarely discussed in public celebrations of the remaking of the 
city—concern the housing compounds that had dominated urban core neighborhoods and the 
workers who occupied them.
39 In interviews, officials and urban planners referenced opposition 
to the relocation work of the 1990s. One urban planner recalled many petitions and attempts at 
protest in 1994 and 1995, but said that because the local party organizations, residents’ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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committees, and work units themselves were not behind the residents, their efforts at collective 
organization failed.
40 Another official clearly stated the dilemma facing residents: they stood to 
lose both their homes and their jobs should they choose to resist relocation. Enterprises often laid 
off a substantial portion of their work force when they moved and underwent restructuring. Since 
the work units and factory managers were supportive of relocation plans, residents and workers 
were actually competing with each other to accept the compensation and relocation 
arrangements.
41  
The relocation campaign began alongside Bo Xilai’s assumption of the city’s leadership 
in 1993—he had served in various party positions in Jinzhou and the DDA since 1984—and 
campaigns to “beautify the city” and transform Dalian into a “commerce and trade, finance, 
tourism, and informational city.”
42 Foreshadowing the kind of campaigns Bo would later become 
infamous for in attempting to transform and re-brand Chongqing, substantial propaganda 
accompanied efforts and economic and spatial reconfiguration in Dalian. The Urban Planning 
and Land Resource Management Bureau chief at the time recalls Bo’s efforts at softening the 
term “demolition” (chai 拆): “Bo Xilai himself said that the green of Dalian will emerge from 
‘chai’ and ‘ba’(扒) [stripping away]. Don’t look down on the word ‘chai,’ because this is really 
tearing down people’s closed hearts and old ideas.”
43 The combination of entwining employment 
prospects with relocation acquiescence, the offer of substantial compensation packages for 
residents by leasing out land, and ideological campaigns to pressure compliance foreclosed any 
viable attempts at collectively resisting eviction and relocation.  
The Dalian municipal authorities’ political economic strategy of global orientation was 
accompanied by a territorial strategy of expansion and segregation. The creation of the extra-	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 ﾠ 	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urban development zone established competition among state firms for municipal government 
assistance rather than competition between those firms and the local state for land control. 
Moreover, the emergent axis of urban politics in Dalian is the reformist, global constituencies in 
the DDA on the one hand and the waning and descendant former power brokers on the other. 
The result of both of these types of competition is a strong municipal state that acts as arbiter 
rather than participant in urban politics and maintains a near monopoly on the use and 
designation of urban land.  
III. TERRITORIAL FRAGMENTATION IN HARBIN 
City officials in Harbin have encountered significant resistance to their plans for urban 
renovation and relocation, and plans for urban expansion have fallen prey to mismanagement and 
intra-local territorial conflict. Harbin’s urban landscape is more of a pastiche of power bases than 
a canvass onto which the local state projects political power and generates wealth. These power 
bases consist of firm or residential occupants who perceive themselves as de facto—if not de 
jure—claimants to property rights over urban land that the city has sought to appropriate or 
reallocate. Unlike its regional counterpart, Harbin had nearly no access to foreign capital early in 
the reform era and therefore reforms to the public sector were introduced in a climate of resource 
scarcity. As officials in Harbin weathered the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s under 
these different political economic conditions, the municipal state steadily relinquished control 
over the urban landscape as a political and economic strategy in its dealings with public sector 
enterprises, laid-off workers, and the entrepreneurial sector. In this section, I take up each of 
these arenas in turn. 
Public Sector Firms 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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While Dalian officials during the 1980s turned outwards, skirting potentially messy 
programs of reform and contests over urban property with centrally located SOEs, Harbin city 
officials steadily reinvested, politically and economically, in large state-owned enterprises. City 
officials did introduce reforms to the state sector, but those reforms were efforts at enterprise 
conglomeration, consolidation, and upgrading, i.e. revitalizing threatened enterprises by 
diversifying the economic activities within their purview and further decentralizing authority 
over their operations. This political economic strategy produced a concomitant territorial strategy 
of distributing and decentralizing control over urban land. 
Harbin’s 1985 master plan sought to limit industrial “sprawl” and rationalize layout by 
concentrating infrastructure investments in extant compounds, mostly located in clusters created 
early in the Maoist era for heavy enterprises and within the city’s six core urban districts. 
Harbin’s four largest industrial compounds were slated to receive investment to “rehabilitate” 
facilities and housing.
44 Plans expressly avoided the acquisition of new urban land and confined 
new industrial construction to existing compounds. Harbin in the 1980s only officially acquired 
four plots of new land for urban construction, all of which surrounded major industrial 
compounds within Daoli and Nangang districts.
45 As early as 1986, the city’s highest officials 
were wrestling with actors from the formal state sector over land control. A 1986 project to build 
a new transport tunnel through Nangang and Xiangfang Districts interfered with the land 
operated by a local factory, whose manager asked for over 8 million RMB in compensation. The 
factory’s compliance required the intervention of the mayor himself, who went to the factory 
manager with the money and personally counted out each bill to reach a “mutual understanding” 
with the manager.
46 This strategy of devolving economic and territorial power to enterprises 
empowered a plurality of urban interests vis-à-vis Harbin’s municipal authorities. As enterprises 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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in Dalian were becoming dependent on city authorities for funding and survival, Harbin 
authorities were becoming dependent on enterprise managers for their acquiescence in basic 
urban plans. 
Laid-Off Workers: Housing and Redistribution 
Layoffs and factory closures, particularly in the late 1980s through the late 1990s, created 
potentially destabilizing sets of “losers” to market reforms, and the use of urban land and control 
of territory constituted a key resource for redistribution to these groups.
47 Harbin in the 1980s 
became nationally famous for rehabilitating dilapidated housing compounds that were part of 
major industrial clusters but not relocating residents.  
Urban China experienced a push toward housing construction in the late 1970s and early 
1980s with multi-level investment with contributions from central and local governments, 
investors, enterprises, and individuals.48 In Harbin, new funds for housing were dispersed 
directly to enterprises.
49 In conjunction with the Municipal Construction Bureau, the enterprises 
used the money to renovate work unit housing and build new housing within compounds. The 
flagship projects were the renovation of Harbin’s two most famous slums, the “36” and “18 
corner” slums, both of which were in the 1950s turned into work unit housing compounds 
attached to machinery plants under the Harbin MBIC. These plants were some of Harbin’s first 
to undergo privatization and layoffs in the 1990s.
50 One Harbin urban planner in charge of such a 
project in Nangang District in the late 1980s viewed renovating housing as a form of “insurance” 
for soon-to-be laid-off workers, since they would get ownership over the apartment that they 
could then rent at a higher price or feel more willing to take entrepreneurial risk because their 
housing was secure.
51 Investing in housing compounds of threatened enterprises was a territorial 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	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strategy, resulting from Harbin’s political economy of survival, of assuaging potentially 
contentious “losers” of reforms.  
Harbin’s general approach to urban territory was one of decentralization, permitting 
neighborhoods and enterprises to draw up and implement their own local plans (xiangxi guihua
详细规划), albeit with approval of the city’s Urban Planning Bureau. An essay by a prominent 
urban planner in Harbin reflects on the process of planning in the 1980s: 
Harbin has had a difficult time incorporating widely accepted and national standards of 
good living environments. For example, average living space per person is much lower 
than the rest of the country, but neighborhoods and surroundings are much more 
convenient. Harbiners do not want to demolish large parts of the old city to build green 
space, and new space for commerce and the tertiary industry has developed somewhat 
organically in the downtown area without a great deal of demolition and reconstruction.
52 
Yu concludes that local discretion over the built environment is a condition particular to Harbin 
and one that has benefitted the distinctive quality of Harbin’s urban form. In short, while Dalian 
was centralizing territorial control, Harbin was distributing that control in exchange for 
cooperation with reforms to the state-run economic sector.   
Emergent Private Industry: Informal Property Rights and the Informal Sector 
  As formal sector workers experienced layoffs and wage cuts or anticipated the 
inevitability, many turned to petty commerce and street-level services as a means of livelihood. 
The spaces in which these activities emerged in Harbin were those that boasted a rich tradition of 
private and commercial activity prior to nationalization in 1956. Daoli district, the center of the 
Russian émigré bourgeoisie in the 1920s, became the epicenter of commercial and service 
development during the reform era. Daowai district houses the Muslim quarter surrounding the 
city’s largest mosque and was settled very densely by Chinese laborers in the early 20
th century. 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
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Both districts claim a long tradition of vibrant private enterprise, and the commercial impulse 
was quick to return under conditions of liberalization.
53 
To be sure, the growth (or return) of commercial streets and bourgeois clusters was far 
from spontaneous. The Harbin MBIC was instrumental in fostering an advantageous 
environment, institutionally and spatially, for these small commercial endeavors. As early as 
1980, the MBIC encouraged experimentation with private business and put forth instructions to 
ease the registration process for urban private enterprises. By 1981, the city had registered over 
12,000 private enterprises, 21 times the number registered at the end of 1978.
54 Critically, the 
onus of encouraging, registering, and approving private enterprise rested with lower levels of 
government. The blossoming of commercial activity— shoe repair, craftsmanship, barber shops, 
food stalls, teahouses, bakeries and the like—emerged under the purview of street offices (jiedao 
banshichu 街道办事处) that were extensively integrated with local communities. The municipal 
branch of the MBIC and its local arms acted as advocates for urban private enterprise, 
designating spaces for operations and turning a blind eye to these activities when they 
contradicted other local governmental policies.
55  
Because of conflicts between the Land Management Bureau and lower levels of 
government seeking to protect the embryonic private sector, the municipal government, against 
the wishes of the Land Bureau, decreed in November 1989 that all new construction projects, 
whether industrial or residential, must allot a minimum of seven per cent of space to commercial 
purposes.
56 Thus emerged a new territorial strategy of clustering the small-scale private sector in 
designated areas rather than allowing informal appropriations of space. In 1991, commercial 
streets were officially designated in places where they already informally operating. Central 
Boulevard boasted 139 independent commercial enterprises by the end of 1991, Fendou Road 	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had over 300, and Jingyu Street over 400, most of which were small businesses run by petty 
entrepreneurs.
57 By 1995, the number of these markets had grown considerably. There were 30 
more such designated areas, and the city of Harbin boasted three of the nation’s fifty largest 
industrial product markets.
58 These markets were not only a substantial source of income and 
economic activity for the city, but also major outlets for reemployment of former public sector 
workers. By 1998, the city hosted 621 official locations with nearly 78,000 registered businesses, 
employing over 127,000 people, 60 per cent of whom were laid-off industrial workers.
59 
The privatizations of the late 1990s further diversified control over land in the urban core 
in two important ways. First, as in many Chinese cities, the sale of public assets, particularly of 
small and medium SOEs, to private entrepreneurs in the late 1990s entailed rapid 
commodification of the land occupied by those enterprises. Privatizations were carried out in a 
climate of particular desperation in Harbin. As a result, many SOE land assets were acquired at 
much lower rates than they were likely worth. In addition, new owners of former SOE land 
assets frequently leased land use on secondary markets without ever paying the local government 
for use rights, either paying sub-market rent to the local government without paying land 
appreciation tax or simply illegally leasing land for commercial purposes.
60 The second way in 
which these privatizations contributed to the erosion of state land control concerns the 
simultaneous implementation of housing privatization and SOE restructuring. In part because of 
the enterprise reforms in the late 1990s but also in part to stimulate an ailing economy following 
the Asian Financial Crisis, housing previously owned and managed by work units was privatized 
all over China in 1998. In Harbin, the implementation of housing privatization during a 
politically difficult climate of layoffs and strikes, in combination with the fiscal difficulties of 
SOEs and the local state, led to the sale of public housing at high losses for the state, entrenching 	 ﾠ 	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workers in their longtime homes and neighborhoods and denying local government prime urban 
real estate for years to come.
61 For example, municipal officials not only sold off SOE housing in 
Xiangfang and Pingfang districts at highly subsidized rates, but also invested further funds in 
upgrading those housing compounds.
 62 These were the exact industrial compounds to experience 
substantial worker unrest, particularly joint strikes and marches among a number of small and 
medium SOEs, in January 1997.
63 
By the late 1990s, land control had become one of the most politically salient issues in 
Harbin, taking a close second place to labor issues even during the most intense strike wave of 
the decade in 1997.
64 Harbin’s economic policies generated territorial strategies that emboldened 
quasi-state actors in enterprises and encouraged new claimants to downtown land in the form of 
a new class of urban entrepreneurs. In addition to struggles with firms and residents, various 
arms of the municipal administration dealt differently with their constituencies in struggles over 
land control, precluding the municipal state from exercising the kind of unified control over 
territory that its counterpart in Dalian did. Once relinquished, territorial control becomes difficult 
to re-assert; in an institutional climate in which property rights over land are highly ambiguous, 
informal control constitutes a powerful claim to ownership.
65 Moreover, entrepreneurs and 
residents who occupy the same space for long periods of time find it easier to articulate a 
collective interest over their continued right to that space.
66 In this sense, informal control over 
territory becomes self-perpetuating: once a municipal state becomes mired in territorial 
fragmentation, the path becomes difficult to reverse.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 	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Urban landscapes in China are canvases onto which governments project political power, and 
land is the primary commodity through which urban governments generate revenue. Ambiguity 
in national institutions governing property rights, however, leaves substantial maneuver space at 
the local level, producing variation in local state control over land.
67 The level of territorial 
control a local state exercises, therefore, offers insight into local state capacity and state-market 
relations. Based on a comparison of two cities that faced similar initial constraints yet, because 
of preferential policies and the sequencing of reforms, adopted different courses of managing 
urban territory, this article has established a framework for a comparative political economy of 
land control. Patterns of land politics in Dalian and Harbin suggest that early access to 
preferential policies empowered the local state vis-à-vis groups in society, while the lack of 
access forced local governments to grant concessions to urban constituencies. It is in the 
wealthier, more globalized city in which territorial and political power are more concentrated in 
the hands of the local state.  
This finding is surprising in light of expectations for the relative power of states and markets 
in China. At the beginning of the reform era as much as now, many have assumed that reforms 
would relax state control over urban life and urban landscapes, as if the freedom of the market 
would supplant state management of Chinese cities. With regard to urban land politics, these 
assumptions have taken the form of arguments that new features of urban landscapes in Chinese 
cities are somehow “organic” results of marketization, absent of the state engineering that 
marked the pre-reform era, or that greater degrees of market reforms would correlate with freer 
urban land markets and greater pluralities of landed interests.
68 But precisely by linking varying 
political economies of reform with the territorial strategies they produced, this comparison of 	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two regional cities demonstrates how foreign opening and economic reform amplified local state 
power, while reforms under scarcity generated power-sharing concessions.  
While there are limits to the ability to generalize from two cases, this comparison of cities in 
the Northeast suggests two additional, preliminary conclusions for land politics in China. The 
fact of ambiguity over land rights in rural China has received a great deal of scholarly attention, 
but less so the same fact inside China’s cities, at least from a political economy perspective.
69 
This lacuna is regrettable considering the clear importance of real estate investment, housing 
provision, and demolition and relocation in urban China. One preliminary conclusion from this 
comparison is that urban China is likely home to a multitude of informal property rights regimes 
that have developed concurrently with reform and opening policies over the last three decades. 
Instead of being a function of changes in central policy toward urban land—or perhaps more 
precisely because of the ambiguity of these policies—property rights claims at local levels are 
possibly endogenous, i.e. they emerge as a result of de facto practices like informal investments 
or agreements over land control rather than as a result of any process of de jure institutional 
change.
70 If so, future research on land politics may benefit more from detailed, empirical 
comparisons of cities in addition to tracking the evolution of central policy and the politics of 
rural land conversion. 
Yet, that different informal property rights regimes have emerged endogenously in different 
cities should not prevent us from attempting to theorize what kinds of regimes emerge under 
which political economic conditions. I have emphasized here the causal importance not of 
socialist legacies or central policy in driving different political economies of land control, but 
instead the role of changes to the post-Mao urban hierarchy and the sequencing of reform and 
opening at the local level. Such a finding suggests that urban China will not likely converge on 	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any single model of land politics or urban property rights in the near future, but rather be home 
to multiple different models that tend to be self-reinforcing. This continued divergence in land 
control regimes will complicate the ability of the central government in Beijing to achieve 
uniform results in a number of recent policy goals, such as the provision of subsidized housing, 
reining in the conversion of agricultural land, and cooling housing and real estate markets.  
   
 
Table 1: Basic Demographic and Economic Indicators, Harbin and Dalian, 2008 
 
  unit  Harbin  Dalian 
Land Area  km
2  53068  12573.85  
Population  persons  9898600  5833745 
GRP 
     Primary 
     Secondary 
           Industry 
     Tertiary 
billions RMB  286.82 
39.02 (13.6%) 
107.7 (51.7%) 







Per Capita Income  RMB  29012  63198 
Unemployment*  per cent  3.2  2 
Employment 
     Selected data by ownership** 
      SOEs 
      Urban Collectives 
      Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao   
               invested 
      Foreign-owned 
      Private 
      Self-employed 
million persons 
/  





















Fixed Asset Investment 
      Residential Buildings 
      Real Estate 







     Local 




Expenditure  billions RMB  30.13  41 
GVIO 
     Selected data by ownership*** 
billions RMB / 
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     Domestic 
         SOEs 
         Collective 
         Private 
     Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao 
         Invested or owned 
     Foreign-invested or owned 
 
 
GVIO  140.3 (57.5%) 
33.5   (13.7%) 
24.1   (9.9%) 
18.3   (7.5%) 





31.0   (5.3%) 
3.13   (0.5%) 
120.6 (20.7%) 
16.8   (2.9%) 
 
210.3 (36%) 
FDI  millions USD  543.09  5007 
All data from year end 2008 and for entire municipalities, i.e. including subsidiary counties and 
cities. I display 2008 data in order to match the timing of the qualitative descriptions of the cities. 
All data, unless otherwise indicated, from Harbin Statistical Yearbook 2009 (Haerbin 2009 
tongji nianjian) and Dalian Statistical Yearbook 2009 (Dalian 2009 tongji nianjian). * From 
Zhongguo laodong tongji nianjian 2008 (China Labor Statistical Yearbook 2008): 153. Accessed 
through China Academic Journals. **Because of incongruous reporting of data across cities, it is 
not possible to directly compare the labor force break down by ownership in 2008. These data 
are selected shares by ownership, and therefore do not add to 100%. *** These data are selected 
shares by ownership, and therefore do not add to 100%. 
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Figure 2: Harbin City and Urban Core Districts, 2000
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Figure 3: Dalian’s Urban Core and the Development Area, 2008 
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Figure 4: Dalian City Small Development Zones 	 ﾠ 	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9 Ho, Samuel. and Lin 2003; Ho, Peter. 2001.  
10 See Hurst 2009, 36.  
11 See Chung 2004. 
12 Hess 2011; Chung, Lai and Joo 2009; Li 2004.  
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15 McKinsey Global Institute 2008, 226. 
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Master Plan Report (Haerbin shi kaifaqu xinqu zongti guihua zhuanti baogao) 2004.  It would 
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28 Cai ,Wang, and Deng 1992, 52- 55. 
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31 China 2000 Census Data. County level census 2000. China Data Online. Accessed June 2012. 
Calculations based on only data for urban districts in Dalian, i.e. excluding counties and 
subsidiary cities. These data include only “floaters,” i.e. non-hukou migrants. The data for 
migrants with hukou is similarly illustrative of the direction of migration into Dalian. In 2008, 
the core urban districts accounted for 67 % of the city’s net growth (i.e. immigrants minus 
emigrants), and Jinzhou District alone accounts for 32 percent of the total net change. Dalian shi 
tongji nianjian 2009. (Dalian City Statistical Yearbook 2009): 646. 
32 Group interview with DDA management committee members. March 2008. 
33 Gallagher 2005, 18.  
34 Interview with former MBIC official (served 1991-1997). January 2008. Housing data from 
1985-1986 National Housing Survey. Cited in Dalian Nianjian, 1986. (Dalian 1986 Yearbook): 
62. 
35 Exhibit in Dalian Modern Museum (Dalian Xiandai Bowuguan), visited February 2008. This 
was nearly half of the large and medium enterprises in the city at the time. Dalian Nianjian, 
1994. (Dalian 1994 Yearbook).  
36 Interview with former MBIC official (served 1991-1997). January 2008. 
37 Example cited in Liu Changde, ed. 2004, 16. 
38 Group interview with DDA management committee members. March 2008. 
39 Credible estimates of the numbers of residents relocated in the 1990s are scarce. The 
December 1995 “Dalian City Residential Neighborhood Work Law” set an agenda of creating 95 
small residential districts (formally part of the “Hong Kong of the North” campaign) and 175 
more in 1996, relocating over 280,000 people in less than a year, which indicates some idea of 
scale. Dalian shi aiguo weisheng yundongzhi, 1988-1998. (Dalian Patriotic Cleanliness 
Campaign, 1988-1998) (Dalian: Dalian Patriotic Cleanliness Campaign Committee, 2001). 
40 Interview with Urban Designer at Dalian Urban Planning Bureau, October 2007, Dalian. On 
the importance of these networks, see Cai and Shi 2006. 
41 Interview with former MBIC official (served 1991-1997). January 2008, Dalian. 
42 “Jianfu kaituo de shiming yu zeren: fang Dalian shi guihua he guotuziyuanju Wang 
Zhenggang juzhang” (“Taking on the Opening Mission and Responsibility: An Interview with 
Dalian Urban Planning and Land Resource Management Bureau chief Wang Zhenggang”). In 
Liu Changde, ed. 2004, 16. 
43 In Chinese, “keyi chaidiao renmin fengbi de xinli he jiu de gainian.” In Liu Changde, ed. 2004, 
15-16.  
44 Harbin City 1985 Master Plan. Harbin City Management Department, 1984. (Archives of the 
Urban Planning Society of Municipal Harbin): 6-7.  The industrial clusters in Pingfang, 
Sankeshu, Haxi, and Dongli were each one of the national 156 “key point” projects for industrial 
construction in the first Five Year Plan. Harbin Shi: Chengshi guihua, tudi, shizheng gongyong 
jianshe zhi (Harbin City Construction Gazetteer). (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 
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45 Harbin City 1985 Master Plan. Harbin City Management Department, 1984. (Archives of the 
Urban Planning Society of Municipal Harbin): 8; Yu Binyang, ed. 2002, 11. 
46 Gu 1987, 21-22.  
47 Lay-offs in Northeastern SOEs began earlier than the late 1990s, though these lay-offs were 
often informal and discussed as “breaks” from work rather than unemployment. See Hurst 2009, 
43-44. 
48 Xiandai Zhongguo de jianshe (Contemporary China’s Construction). (Beijing: Academy of 
Social Sciences Press, 1990): 108-110.  
49 Xinhua 28 November 1980 (FBIS); Harbin Party History Materials, Part 3. (Ha’erbin 
dangshi ziliao) Harbin Municipal Archives, D235.351/01-3. The Municipal Party Committee 
actually devolved control over housing assignments to worker congresses (gonghui) after unrest 
over unfair housing assignments.  
50 Interview with Vice Director of Harbin Society of Urban Planners, October 2007.   
51 Interview with Senior Urban Planners, retired. November 2007. 
52 Yu Binyang, “Create the Concept of Modern Urban Planning and Act as the ‘Dragon Head’ of 
City Management,” in Yu, ed. 2002, 76. This essay was selected by the Municipal government as 
the third most outstanding essay on Harbin published in 2002—a sign that Yu’s views are 
reflecting those of the authorities.   
53 Daowai before 1949 was home to 4950 self-owned stores and businesses – 63% of such 
businesses citywide. Haerbin shi Daowai qu shehui jingji fazhan tongji zonghe nianjian, 1978-
1987. (Daowai District Social and Economic Development Comprehensive Statistical Yearbook, 
1978-1987). Harbin, 1988: 3.  
54 Heilongjiang sheng minying qiye jingji nianjian. (Heilongjiang Province Private Enterprise 
Economic Yearbook.). (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 2004): 102. 
55 Interviews with members of Daowai District Commerce Association, March 2008. Business 
owners throughout Jingyu market accredited the MBIC, chiefly its Daowai district organ, for 
their survival during the hard times of the 1990s. 
56“Harbin City Measures on Construction Management of Commercial Space” (Haerbin shi 
shangye wangdian jianshe guanli banfa). Haerbin Nianjian, 1990. (Harbin Yearbook, 1990): 
271, 597. This section relies heavily on an interview with two senior Urban Planners, now 
retired. November 2007.  
57 Haerbin Nianjian, 1992. (Harbin Yearbook, 1992): 223. 
58 Haerbin Nianjian, 1995. (Harbin Yearbook, 1995): 65. These markets were the physical 
spaces in which enterprises that produced over planned quotas could sell their wares at market 
for retained profits and enterprises on the demand side were permitted to source their own 
materials at prices determined by market exchange.  
59 Haerbin Nianjian, 1999. (Harbin Yearbook, 1999): 70. 
60 Interview with multiple Land Resource Bureau officials, November 2007. Note that this “loss 
of land resources” through ownership changes was occurring in Harbin as early as 1993 
according to Zhu Yongquan, the director of the Harbin Land Management Bureau in the late 
1980s through mid-1990s, Zhu 1996. This kind of illegal land use was pervasive all over China. 
Ho and Lin 2003, 696-98. 
61 This is not unique to Harbin, but likely occurred in many cities facing fiscal difficulties in the 
late 1990s. See Logan, Fang, and Zhang 2011. 	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62 Urban Planning Bureau of Harbin Municipality and Urban Planning and Design Research 
Institute, 2004. Master Plan of Harbin, 2004-2020: Manual. (Haerbin Chengshi Guihua Zongti 
Guihua (2004-2020) Shuoming Shu): Chapter 8.  
63 Harbin Yearbook, 1998. [Haerbin Nianjian, 1998]: 124.  
64 According to letters and visits (xinfang shangfang) data for 1997, issues of insurance, pension, 
and wages for laid-off or retired workers accounted for 25% of collective visits or letters (that is, 
group visits and petitions), and city construction, relocation, and planning accounted for another 
20%. Haerbin Nianjian, 1998. (Harbin Yearbook, 1998): 83. 
65 Besley 1995.  
66 Cai and Shi 2006; on the role of ecology in collective action in China, see Zhao 2001.  
67 Ho, P. 2001. 
68 E.g., Hamer 1990; Gaubatz 1995. 
69 Exceptions include Hsing 2006; Hsing 2010; Duckett 1998.  
70 See Besley 1995. 
71 In 2004, Taiping District merged with its surrounding districts, and Hulan County, north of the 
Songhua River, became Songbei and Hulan Districts.  